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At the start of the 2009 academic year, ShenyangUniversity in the province of Liaoning launched anew law course specialising in the petitioning sys-
tem. According to the director of communications at
Shenyang University, Yang Kailai, the 35 students who are
to receive an education in this subject will be able to offset
the understaffing of the Shenyang Bureau of Letters and
Calls. (1) The fact is that across the country, in the face of the
constant increase in the number of petitions filed by the gen-
eral public in the last few years, (2) and especially in the face
of the increase in collective petitions, the government offi-
cials in charge of dealing with petitions are experiencing gen-
uine difficulties.
According to Yu Jianrong, professor and director of the cen-
tre for research into social issues at the Institute of Rural De-
velopment of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
(CASS), (3) the pressure being exerted on the petitioning
system lies at the heart of the current failures that are
paralysing the whole process. For Yu Jianrong, this pressure
works in two directions: there is the pressure of the central
authorities on the local authorities, who have to be capable
of dealing with the petitions at the local level, but there is
also pressure on the central authorities, to which the local
authorities frequently send on locally-initiated petitions when
they are unable to find a satisfactory solution. Yu Jianrong
feels that it is not so much the pressure linked to the recep-
tion and thus the handling of the petitions that is weakening
the system, but rather the pressure linked to the transfer of
the petitions between the different administrative levels of
the bureaucracy, and particularly the return in fine of the pe-
titions to the central authorities: “[…], it is the pressure
linked to the transfer, and not the pressure linked to the han-
dling”; “[…] once the pressure has gone round once, it ends
up returning to the central authorities.” Yu Jianrong’s analy-
sis refers to a very concrete reality on the ground. Between
the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, the Political
and Legislative Affairs Committee (4) of the Central Commit-
tee of the CCP requested the dedicated provincial commit-
tees to work on the basis of the data from the social science
1. See “Petitions get voice in new course,” Wang Huazhong, China Daily, 9 June 2009; ar-
ticle available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ cndy/2009-06/09/con-
tent_8261526.htm.
2. The exact figures are difficult to verify. According to China Labour Bulletin and Rights
and Democracy, there would have been 18.6 million cases in total in 2004, and the Bu-
reau of Letters and Calls of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
alone is said to have received 40,433 visits and 124,174 letters in 2005, an increase of
50.4% and 83.9%, respectively, over 2004 (No Way Out, Worker Activism in China’s
State Owned Enterprise Reforms, page 8, “The Petitioning System,” China Labour Bul-
letin/Rights and Democracy, September 2008; document available online at:
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/ en/files/File/research_reports/no_way_out.pdf).
3. Yu Jianrong is very well known for his articles on social conflicts, activism, and the
rights of peasants and workers. The results of a research project that he initiated on the
petitioning system were published in 2004. See http://www.lawtime.cn/info/lunwen/
xzqtxzflw/2006102647495.html, critique of the petition system in China.
4. The Secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee is Zhou Yongkang. He
was previously Minister of Public Security of the PRC from 2002 to 2007 and is currently
a member of the Politburo of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP and of its standing
committee.
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• Wu Yang, “Debate at the highest level of the CCP on the question of maintaining or abandoning the petition system,”
Chengming, 2 May 2009
• Yu Jianrong, “University specialisation in ‘petitions’: What needs to be studied,” Nanfang Zhoumo, 10 June 2009
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research institutes on the social situation in 2009. The re-
sults speak volumes: Besides the fact that the principle of so-
cial stability was reiterated, it appears that “the local cadres
strongly requested the abolition of the petitioning system.” In
fact, not only do 78 percent of the cadres in the rural com-
munes request that the petition system be abolished, but 66
percent of district cadres feel for their part that they are “car-
rying the can” to their detriment. According to Yu Jianrong,
the direct consequence of this state of affairs and of the pres-
sure that is exerted on local officials is that the latter, instead
of doing their best to find a solution to the problems exposed
by the petitions, instead direct their efforts at measures in-
tended to reinforce their control over the people who file the
petitions. But that seems to have little effect on either the de-
sire or the tenacity of the “petitioners.”
The “right to petition” is set out in article 41 of the Chinese
constitution, (5) and having gained strong support among the
Chinese population, the petitioning system is regarded today
as an alternative procedure to judicial recourse. Instituted in
1951 at the beginning of the communist era, it originally had
the aim, as Yu Jianrong indicates and according to the
phraseology currently in force, of contributing to the
strengthening of the legitimisation of the new political
power, to the solving of social contradictions, to the mobili-
sation of the masses, and also to the exercise of some form
of control over officials. Now, over 50 years later, the system
is obviously stuck. With the weariness of the officials in
charge of petitions, the tortuous paths of bureaucracy, the
sometimes serious incidents that occur in the course of peti-
tioning, the petitions that remain dead letters, and the con-
stant increase in the number of petitions being filed as well
as the intensification of the phenomenon of collective peti-
tions, the question of the efficacy of the petitioning system
cries out for a response.
The petition system was the subject of  heated debate in the
highest corridors of central power during the month of April
2009. The points of view diverge, and the system’s detrac-
tors and promoters are struggling to find common ground,
even if everyone acknowledges the deficiencies in the cur-
rent system and concedes that the 2005 reforms (6) have been
far from satisfactory. Vice Premier Li Keqiang even goes so
far as to deplore the fact that “a good number of petitions
do not have any ground linked to political affairs but fulfil the
pursuit of purely personal interests.” Zhou Yongkang and
the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of which he
is the secretary, drawing on the results of the Committee’s
studies of the subject, have come to desire the abolition of
the petitioning system, but others are following the example
of Bo Xilai, CCP secretary in the municipality of
Chongqing and former Minister of Commerce, who seems
to favour the system. While in Chongqing on 6 April 2009,
Bo Xilai stated: “The handling of petitions has to be taken
seriously; each petitioner has to be taken seriously.”
Sun Dongdong, professor and director of the Judicial Ex-
pertise Centre at Peking University, who is at the heart of a
firestorm that raged in China at the beginning of April
2009, (7) is certainly not, for his part, a member of the group
that promotes the petitioning system. The fact remains that
the controversy surrounding Sun Dongdong, now dubbed by
the media as the “psychiatry incident,” has not facilitated
the task of the central authorities, for whom 2009 is already
an especially sensitive year. Certain experts and analysts be-
lieve that this incident could constitute a new element, the
fifth, likely to spark social tensions and thus threaten “social
harmony.” In fact, the report of the Political and Legislative
Affairs Committee on the “Different types of forces that
threaten stability in 2009” had only mentioned four poten-
tially destabilising elements, most notably the 20th anniver-
sary of the events that took place in Tiananmen Square in
June 1989. •
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5. Article 41 of China’s constitutions states: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China
have the right to criticise and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary. Citi-
zens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or
exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary;
but fabrication or distortion of facts with the intention of libel or frame-up is prohibited.
In case of complaints, charges or exposures made by citizens, the state organ con-
cerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after ascertaining the facts. No one
may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens
making them. Citizens who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil
rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance
with the law.” (The full text of the Chinese constitution is available in English online at:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
6. The reforms came into force on 1 May 2005. The text of the reforms is available in Eng-
lish online at: http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/bj/laws/rolav357/.
7. During an interview granted to China Newsweek on 23 March 2009, in which he was
asked about the sending of petitioners to psychiatric hospitals, Sun replied that “more
than 99% of ‘petitioners’ suffered from psychiatric problems.” For more details, see in
particular: “Scholar sorry for ‘insane’ words on petitioners,” China Daily, 7 April 2009. 
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At the end of May, Chen Chu, the mayor of Kaohsi-ung from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),travelled to Beijing and Shanghai, where she was
welcomed by her counterparts Guo Jinlong and Han Zheng.
A historical visit, it marked the first time a figure from the
DPP of this rank had made such a trip. Some articles in the
island’s press, in particular the weekly Xin Xinwen, (1) pre-
ferred to see, rather than any political dimension, the strictly
technical necessity for Chen Chu, who is also president of
the organising committee of the World Games that took
place in Kaohsiung from 16 to 26 July, to provide reassur-
ances to Beijing concerning the security of the Chinese
teams that would take part in the sports events, in particular
following the aggression shown by pro-independence ac-
tivists last year in Tainan against ARATS vice-president
Zhang Mingqing. (2) Others, such as the Taipei Times, cit-
ing the 22 May 2008 analysis of Chinese academic Wu
Nengyuan, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the
Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, (3) mentioned electoral
calculations and the necessity for Chen Chu to demonstrate
to the electorate beyond her partisan base her desire to see
the city profit from the normalisation of cross-strait economic
relations. 
In contrast, it was primarily the press close to the Kuom-
intang (KMT) that strove to analyse the political signifi-
cance of Chen Chu’s trip and the power struggles it has in-
duced at the heart of the DPP. The three articles quoted
here are unanimous in underlining the failure of Tsai Ing-
wen in the chairmanship of the party, the ideological sclero-
sis that is now reflected in the reality of these power strug-
gles, and the possible ideological evolution that Chen Chu’s
visit offers the opposition. 
In its editorial, the Lianhe bao describes the ideological scle-
rosis of the DPP, which has been exacerbated by Chen
Chu’s visit. While they can take no action against each
other, neither Tsai Ing-wen nor the pro-independence and
fundamentalist factions in favour of preserving Chen Shui-
bian’s political heritage are ready to step down, in contrast
to the great leaders of the past such as Lin Yi-hsiung, Hsu
Hsing-liang, and Shih Ming-teh, who accepted the principle
of resignation. Since the DPP’s defeat in 2008, Tsai Ing-
wen has given up on making headway without these pro-in-
dependence factions, even if this was not her intention at the
beginning of her mandate. The principle of Chen Chu’s
visit, admitted with great difficulty by the DPP, probably
signs their political death warrant, with Chen Shui-bian no
longer having the means to protect the pro-independence
factions and vice versa, according to the article’s analysis of
the situation. Strategically and emotionally speaking, this is
the moment for the DPP to part ways with these legacies
and to declare an ideological schism. The editorial ends by
recalling the effective role that these factions played as the
pro-independence spectre in the face of Beijing, and which
even now serves the current head of state, Ma Ying-jeou.
The question posed today is whether the DPP still wants to
adopt this role as the pro-independence party. The article
underlines the existence of a dilemma between the fear of
losing a valuable card in the face-off with Beijing and the
fear, for the DPP, of being taken hostage by the pro-inde-
pendence factions. While the party represents 40 percent of
the electorate, this latter outcome, believes the editorial,
would be tragic for Taiwan and its democracy.
The first editorial in Zhongguo shibao puts forward an iden-
tical analysis of the ideological rigour that continues to pre-
vail in the DPP. Under the reign of Chen Shui-bian, the
stranglehold that the pro-independence factions exerted on
114 N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
1. “The World Games prepares for the anti-terrorist fight, but also the anti-riot fight,” Xin
Xinwen (The Journalist), no. 1163, 18-24 June 2009. 
2. “ARATS man jostled, jeered at in Tainan,” Taipei Times, 22 October 2008. 
3. “Chen Chu proceeding with PRC trip,” Taipei Times, 21 May 2009.
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• “Internal tensions in the DPP: Pandora’s box opened in executive committee,” Lianhe bao – United Daily News, 9 June
2009, editorial pages.
• “When Chen Chu was in prison fighting for independence, where was Tsai Ing-wen?,” Zhongguo shibao – China Times, 
30 May 2009, editorial pages.
• “Where Tsai Ing-wen failed, Chen Chu finds success,” Zhongguo shibao – China Times, 23 May 2009, editorial pages.
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the party had the consequence of first impoverishing and
then, from 2004, shutting off the debate on mainland policy
initiated in the 1990s by figures such as Hsu Hsing-liang. (4)
In opposition for more than a year now, the editorial goes on
to say, the DPP continues to apply the grid of Chen Shui-
bian’s ideological reading, condemning the mainland policy
of the current head of state, Ma Ying-jeou, all the while that
the opening of the island to Chinese investments and Chi-
nese tourism, as well as the promotion of the island’s agricul-
tural products on the Chinese market, represents an eco-
nomic interest for the island’s districts that are governed by
the DPP. It is also impossible, notes the editorial, for Chen
Chu to stand in the way of closer co-operation between the
ports of Kaohsiung and Shanghai, all the more so as these
overtures fulfil the economic needs of the Taiwanese.
The two editorials that appeared in Zhongguo shibao also
analyse the impact of Chen Chu’s visit to China from the
point of view of the psychology and the political careers of
the two women. Tsai Ing-wen is here presented as a techno-
crat trained by the Kuomintang under Lee Teng-hui (to
whom she was previously special advisor for national secu-
rity (5)) and who has climbed up through the ranks of govern-
ment, from the National Security Council, where Chen
Shui-bian had placed her, to the post of Minister for Main-
land Affairs and then that of Vice Premier. Before being
cast as the head of the DPP, of which she had never been
a member, she gained fame at Mainland Affairs for applying
the principle of “risk management” that she has continued
to apply rigidly in her party today, as demonstrated by the
resolution adopted on trips to China following Chen Chu’s
visit. This portrait stands out against that of Chen Chu, de-
picted as an important figure in the fight for independence,
having paid for her struggle with years in prison, and as the
last of the old Formosa faction to occupy a position of polit-
ical importance today. Contrasted here are Tsai Ing-wen’s
conservative rigidity and Chen Chu’s political courage.
The second editorial continues with a criticism of the deci-
sion-making process in the matter of mainland policy such as
it has been deployed in particular by Tsai Ing-wen. Before
the democratic change-over in 2000, the problem of Lee
Teng-hui’s KMT was that the senior civil servants and polit-
ical leaders in charge of Taiwan’s mainland policy had no ex-
perience of China and spent their time shut away in their of-
fices reading the reports of the National Security Council.
With Chen Shui-bian, while cross-Strait exchanges had
flourished for a good 10 years already, the decision-makers
were forbidden from visiting China by the Taiwanese gov-
ernment; they spent their time reading the same reports pro-
moting the ideology of the Chinese threat. Tsai Ing-wen,
who turned herself into an advocate of the need for “risk
management” in the face of the opening up, has not in fact
changed anything today, assert the two Zhongguo shibao ed-
itorials. However, starting from January 2006, when the
Chen Shui-bian administration began to apply the principle
of active management and effective opening-up, (6) the de-
bates on strategy and mainland policy have almost petered
out in favour of a rigid souverainism that is supposed to help
win elections. 
From that, it is necessary to read into this visit to China a
political message addressed to the party, which has ceased
to evolve over the past nine years. This would be, asserts the
editorial, a means for Chen Chu to try not to take a stance
in the confrontation with Chen Shui-bian’s political heritage,
while at the same time preparing a new political line. As
early as 2001, Hsieh Chang-ting, mayor of Kaohsiung at
that time, had wanted to visit the city of Xiamen in the Chi-
nese province of Fujian. (7) Chen Shui-bian, who was then
party chairman, had opposed this visit, and Tsai Ing-wen,
then Minister of Mainland Affairs, had reinforced the meas-
ures banning government figures and elected local represen-
tatives from going to mainland China. Today, Tsai Ing-wen
has been placed in a delicate position and has no choice but
to allow what she has spent several years prohibiting, states
the article. 
Returning to the political value of the visit itself, the third ed-
itorial recalls that this was not Chen Chu’s first visit to main-
land China. Back in 1999, while she was still an opposition
MP, she went to Beijing to see a sick friend. (8) Today she
has gone to mainland China as the most powerful political
115N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
4. During the decade starting in the 1990s and up to 2001, the DPP pursued a genuine
strategic reflection over its mainland policy. A consensus emerged at a symposium held
in 1998. At this time, Hsu Hsin-liang and his Formosa faction, of which Chen Chu was a
member, were advocates of stronger economic integration with China. The proposal was
retained under the slogan “Go West Boldly.” This eventually led to a strategy entitled
“Strengthen the Base and Go West” that was adopted by Chen Shui-bian, who intro-
duced it into his electoral platform during the 2000 presidential campaign. It is detailed
in the White Book on the Chinese policy of the DPP, which was published on 15 Novem-
ber 1999.
5. Tsai helped draft the well-known qualification of cross-Strait relations as “special state-
to-state relations” that, enounced by Lee Teng-hui on 7 July 1999, provoked the sus-
pension of the official dialogue between SEF and ARATS, the firing of missiles, and a
hardening of Beijing’s Taiwan policy.
6. “Chen to tighten cross-Strait policies,” Taipei Times, 2 January 2006. 
7. One case, the twinning project that the Kaohsiung mayor and chairman of the Demo-
cratic Progressive Pary, Hsieh Chang-ting, envisaged in July 2000 with the city of Xia-
men in the province of Fujian, was the subject of an administrative readjustment. It
should be noted, however, that other sources assert that Chen Shui-bian had given his
agreement, while Beijing scuppered the project.
8. This also happened with Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiu-lian the same year. See Dang
Chaosheng and Liu Hong, Le Parti démocrate-progressiste, étude de sa politique conti-
nentale, 2006 (Taiwanese reissue of the original Chinese work), pp. 59-63.
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figure of the opposition. And she has succeeded at some-
thing that no member of the Kuomintang has achieved up to
now, and without letting the DPP down: describing in Bei-
jing the president of the Republic of China as “the president
Ma Ying-jeou of our central government,” noting how “Tai-
wan was a democratic and pluralistic, multiparty democ-
racy,” and even going so far as to explain that opinions and
trends were just as diverse within the DPP. She managed to
deliver to Beijing the message that China could no longer ig-
nore the DPP or the political reality in Taiwan, and that it
could not ensconce itself in a dialogue solely with the KMT,
underlining the importance of such an overture from the per-
spective of a normalisation of cross-strait relations. The two
editorials finally underline the support given to this political
message by the former vice-president of the Republic, Lu
Hsiu-lien, who called on the DPP to acknowledge the evo-
lution of the CCP, “which is no longer that of Tiananmen
and 4 June 1989.” 
The three editorials conclude finally with the isolation of
Tsai Ing-wen in the face of Chen Chu’s political boldness.
To back up their argument, they note that little credit has
been given to Tsai Ing-wen’s idea to organise a referendum
on the economic agreement that the government wishes to
sign with China, and that she must now reckon with Chen
Chu, who has just succeeded where the chairwoman has
failed. The management of Chen Shui-bian’s political her-
itage, the declining influence of the pro-independence fac-
tions, Tsai Ing-wen’s weakness, and the breach opened by
Chen Chu are likely to represent factors that will carry
weight in the articulation of the ideological mutation of the
DPP – if that mutation takes place. •
• Translated by Nick Oates
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